Evidence and investor behaviour: investing glossary

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Definitions of benchmarks, backtests, research biases, FOMO and common decision biases, with links to the handbook's explanations and examples.

Find another term. Follow an explanation link; use Back to return here. Behavioural terms describe tendencies, not diagnoses or instructions to trade.

Anchoring

Giving an initial reference excessive influence over new judgements. Waiting for purchase-price recovery regardless of a holding’s current purpose or spending deadline is an investment example.

The purchase-price anchor

Backtest

A historical simulation of stated investment rules, distinct from live investing. Data availability, costs, assumptions and choices made after inspecting results determine what it can establish.

The search behind a simulation

Benchmark

A defined performance reference, such as an index/mix. Match exposure, dates, currency, income and costs. Outperforming it still differs from having enough for your goal.

A fair comparison

Confirmation bias

Overweighting supportive information while dismissing contrary evidence. Reviewing a favoured holding can become collecting justifications; identify evidence that could change the rationale.

What could change the decision?

Data mining

Searching data for patterns. Many holdings/dates/rules can produce impressive chance results; hiding that search overstates evidence. A discovered pattern needs a credible explanation and further tests.

How many alternatives were tried?

Expected return

A probability-weighted estimate of possible returns, dependent on assumed outcomes/probabilities. It need not occur and differs from historical averages or promises. More risk compels no estimated reward.

The estimate and assumptions

FOMO

Fear of missing out: pressure to join because others seem to gain or an opportunity seems fleeting. It can rush decisions; another investor’s gain establishes no fit with your finances.

Whose result is relevant?

Hindsight bias

Treating an event as more predictable after knowing its outcome. Retrospective explanations can hide once-plausible alternatives. Assess anticipation using information actually available before the decision.

What was knowable then?

In-sample and out-of-sample

In-sample data develop/select an approach; out-of-sample data test it independently. Repeated inspection and redesign can compromise that separation. The label guarantees neither independence nor future performance.

Was the test kept separate?

Look-ahead bias

Using information in a simulation before investors could have known it, such as revised statistics or later index membership. Correct arithmetic cannot make such historical decisions feasible.

Release dates and revisions

Loss aversion

Giving losses greater weight than comparable gains relative to a reference point. It can encourage risk-taking or avoidance, differs from financial capacity and implies no universal loss-to-gain ratio or behaviour.

Discomfort and capacity

Model risk

Risk of misleading decisions from a model’s design, data or assumptions, including omitted/understated losses. More simulations using unchanged assumptions cannot repair their omissions.

What the model leaves out

Outcome bias

Overweighting the eventual result when judging a decision. Gains can follow poor reasoning and losses sound reasoning. Results remain evidence alongside the original purpose, information, alternatives and risks.

Process and result

Overconfidence

Used here for treating a judgement or forecast as more certain than its evidence warrants. As a decision check, ask whether a few successes justify the confidence behind a larger commitment, and what being wrong about that amount would mean.

Confidence and amount at risk

Overfitting

Adapting an approach to data-specific features that generalise poorly. Selecting simple static portfolios can overfit too. One poor later period alone does not prove it.

Fit versus further evidence

Regret aversion

Used here as a decision check: how much of the choice is driven by avoiding future regret? Consider both acting and waiting against the plan, rather than assuming either response will prevent regret. This is an editorial prompt, not a claim that regret always makes investors more cautious.

Reasons for action or inaction

Rolling window

A fixed-length period moved through a dataset. It adds starting dates, but neighbouring windows can share almost all observations; window count is not a count of independent investment experiences.

Shared observations

Selection bias

Distortion from how observations are chosen. Successful investors/holdings or favourable dates can misrepresent the opportunity set despite correct displayed arithmetic. Examine selection rules and exclusions.

The missing observations

Survivorship bias

Selection bias from including only surviving/available investments. Closed or merged funds belong to the original opportunity set; closure need not mean total loss. Establish their returns and proceeds treatment.

The original fund group

Track record

Results attributed to an investment/manager. Identify live, simulated or mixed history and mandate changes; assess period, risk, costs and completeness. A long chart need not represent long live management.

What the chart records

Uncertainty

Incomplete knowledge of outcomes or probabilities. Estimated success depends on its model/plan; this handbook keeps those limits visible without assuming reliable numerical probabilities exist for every important risk.

Success and its limits

Related materials

Reading list

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